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With characteristic vigour, Devitt opposes the view I advocate in Truth-
Conditional Pragmatics, namely contextualism (which following Neale he 
calls ‘linguistic pragmatism’); but the disagreement between us seems to me 
more apparent than real. 
Let us start by considering the ‘three methodological flaws of linguistic 
pragmatism’ which Devitt identifies. One of them has to do with the appeal 
to Grice’s ‘Modified Occam’s Razor’. Even though Grice’s Razor is not to-
tally useless, I tend to agree with Devitt’s criticism of the way it’s been used 
(and abused) in the literature, and I myself have criticized Grice’s and 
Kripke’s use of the Razor against Strawson and Donnellan respectively 
[Recanati (1994), (2004), pp. 155-58].
1
 I will therefore put the Razor aside 
and focus on the other two ‘flaws’ : the systematic appeal to intuitions con-
cerning what is said, theorized in my work under the banner of the ‘availabil-
ity principle’, and the no less systematic confusion between metaphysical and 
epistemological issues. 
Regarding the metaphysics/epistemology distinction, I am sure I have 
been careless in my formulations. Devitt, Bach and Neale can’t all be wrong 
about that! Yet, at bottom, I plead non-guilty; for the mix of metaphysics and 
epistemology which they detect in my writings and complain about is delib-
erate — to some extent at least. It is a genuine metaphysical thesis (not just 
the result of confusion) that what is said by an utterance is constituted by 
epistemological facts about what counts as understanding that utterance. That 
is the view I sketched in Literal Meaning. I know that Devitt is skeptical of 
any such view and I apologize for not being able to address his challenge by 
providing detailed arguments. Detailed arguments are admittedly required, 
but I don’t have enough space for such a discussion here. 
Regarding intuitions, I think there is a misunderstanding. ‘Pragmatists 
rest their theories ultimately on appeals to meta-linguistic intuitions’, Devitt 
says. But, he points out, ‘we should not proceed by simply consulting intui-
tions’: 
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Why should we care about these meta-linguistic intuitions in the scien-
tific study of language and communication? We should be concerned 
with the application of a theoretically motivated what-is-said. And we 
should not expect any intuitions the folk may have about the application 
of any notion of what-is-said they may have to be a reliable guide to the 
application of the needed theoretical notion [this volume, p. 00]. 
 
I fully agree, and I said so myself many times, from my 1989 paper on ‘The 
Pragmatics of What is Said’ (where the availability principle is introduced for 
the first time) to Literal Meaning (2004). But I disagree with the claim that 
contextualists like myself appeal to metalinguistic intuitions. We don’t, or at 
least, I don’t.2 
The misunderstanding is two-fold. First, the intuitions about what is said I 
say we should appeal to are not metalinguistic intuitions at all. They are direct 
intuitions about truth-conditional content. As I say in Literal Meaning, 
 
I assume that whoever fully understands a declarative utterance knows (…) in 
what sort of circumstance it would be true. The ability to pair an utterance with 
a type of situation in this way is more basic than, and in any case does not pre-
suppose, the ability to report what is said by using indirect speech; it does not 
even presuppose mastery of the notion of ‘saying’ [nor, for that matter, of the 
notion of ‘truth’]. Thus the proper way to elicit such intuitions is not to ask the 
subjects ‘What do you think is said (as opposed to implied or whatever) by this 
sentence as uttered in that situation’? [Recanati (2004) p. 1] 
 
The proper way to elicit such intuitions is to proceed as experimental psy-
chologists do when they set up so-called truth-value judgement tasks using 
various paradigms. The intuitions such tasks are meant to reveal are first or-
der intuitions about the situation described by a given utterance. Such intui-
tions are prompted by the utterance, but they are not reflective, metalinguistic 
intuitions about the utterance and what it ‘says’. 
 
Second, the reason we care about such intuitions has nothing to do with 
deference to the folk conception: they are data and our theory should account 
for them. In ‘The Pragmatics of What is Said’ I addressed Devitt’s worry by 
anticipation: 
 
I agree that scientific theorizing is to be freed from, rather than impeded by, in-
tuitions and common sense, which provide only a starting point. [But] human 
cognition is a very special field: in this field, our intuitions are not just a first 
shot at a theory (…) but also part of what the theory is about, and as such they 
cannot be neglected [Recanati (1989), p. 327]. 
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So I agree with Devitt that the notion of ‘what is said’ that features in our se-
mantic theorizing is, and should be, a theoretical notion. My ‘availability hy-
pothesis’ regarding what is said is itself a theoretical hypothesis. That is the 
hypothesis that, in language processing, we have conscious access to truth-
conditional content, but not, say, to lexical meanings or to composition rules. 
The truth-conditional content we are thus conscious of (if the hypothesis is cor-
rect) is what I call ‘what is said in the intuitive sense’. It is one (theoretical) no-
tion of what is said – I distinguish it from several others. My claim is that what 
is said, in that sense, does not obey the minimalist constraint which applies to 
semantic content in traditional theories. I also claim that that notion of what is 
said carves nature at the joints and should be the one we use in our theorizing 
(as opposed to the traditional one). 
Devitt says there are two questions which the contextualist is unable to 
answer. They are: 
 
(1) How can a sentential utterance have a linguistic meaning (a ‘con-
ventionally constituted constraining property’) without that meaning 
fully determining a truth-condition? 
 
(2) How can this property allow indefinitely many truth-conditions? 
 
Unfortunately, in discussing these issues, Devitt does not distinguish between 
the two contextualist positions I characterize in the book, namely Truth-
Conditional Pragmatics (TCP) and Radical Contextualism (RC). He mentions 
the distinction as helpful but keeps referring to ‘RC/TCP’ in his discussion. 
This is unfortunate because the above questions will be answered very differ-
ently depending on the framework one chooses. I start with TCP, the position 
officially defended in the book. 
With respect to TCP, question 1 carries a false presupposition: for TCP 
does not deny that the linguistic meaning of an utterance may fully determine 
a truth-condition. TCP simply points out that the ‘literal’ truth-condition thus 
determined need not correspond to what is said in the intuitive sense. Thus in 
‘The ham sandwich left without paying’, the truth-condition determined by 
linguistic meaning alone is very different from the intuitive truth-condition 
(involving the ham sandwich orderer). To get the intuitive truth-conditions 
the meaning of ‘ham sandwich’ must be pragmatically modulated. Indefinite-
ly many truth-conditions can be generated because there are indefinitely 
many modulation functions that can apply to the meaning of a given expres-
sion such as ‘ham sandwich’. Even if we consider a single modulation func-
tion, we can get an indefinite number of modulated meanings for a given 
expression through recursive iteration. Thus, as Jonathan Cohen once pointed 
out, an expression designating an object o can (through modulation) desig-
nate a representation of o, and that modulated meaning can serve as input to 
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the same modulation function, yielding a new meaning (a representation of a 
representation of o), and so on indefinitely [Cohen (1985)].
3
 
What about RC? RC does deny that linguistic meaning determines 
truth-conditions. On one prominent version of RC, linguistic meaning is rep-
resentationally under-specified and needs a lot of pragmatic fleshing out be-
fore a truth-condition is actually determined.
4
 Devitt wonders why this under-
specification cannot be handled using the traditional notion of indexicality. In 
the book there is a discussion of the difference between semantic under-
specification and indexicality [Recanati (2010), pp. 181ff]; but even if one is 
not convinced by that discussion and holds that under-specification is nothing 
but a form of indexicality (in a broad sense), that is fine with me: as Devitt 
points out, I hold that RC can be construed as a generalization of indexicality. 
Devitt wonders why this is still a form of contextualism: after all, the tradi-
tional approach can handle indexicality, so why is RC not just a version of 
the traditional approach? Well, the traditional approach, as Devitt puts it, is 
the view that ‘a sentential utterance has its truth-conditional content simply in 
virtue of the conventional rules of the speaker’s language’; in other words, lin-
guistic meaning equals representational content. Indexicals are an obvious coun-
terexample, and were presented as such by the early contextualists (Austin, 
Strawson, etc.). To handle them, the traditionalist needs to introduce one of the 
two ‘qualifications’ Devitt talks about at the beginning of his paper: if the 
sentence contains indexicals then we need a more complicated story with a 
distinction between character and content. But if every expression is indexi-
cal or under-specified, then we’re no longer ‘qualifying’ the traditional view: 
we’re giving it up. It is essential to the traditional view that indexicality is a 
limited, circumscribed phenomenon, for the goal of the traditional view in its 
successive guises has always been to minimize the gap between linguistic 





1 As I show in these works, the Razor has typically been used to argue against 
Contextualism, so I think it is a mistake on Devitt’s part to claim that Contextualism 
rests on the Razor. 
2 In Literal Meaning, I criticize the appeal to metalinguistic intuitions by au-
thors such as Gibbs and Moise, Bach, and Cappelen and Lepore. 
3 Around the end of his paper Devitt accepts that enrichment, empoverishment 
and other modulation processes play a role in linguistic interpretation, as TCP claims. 
But, he says, what’s enriched or impoverished is the semantic content of the expres-
sion, and that semantic content is fully determined by the rules of the language inde-
pendent of pragmatic modulation. Fine: one can very well use ‘semantic content’ (or 
‘what is said’) in conformity to the stipulation that semantic content must obey the 
minimalist constraint. TCP’s claim is that if the notion we are after is intuitive truth-
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conditional content, then it must be acknowledged that it results in part from modula-
tion operations and violates the minimalist constraint. (Devitt seems to accept that.) 
TCP also claims that the intuitive notion of what is said has more work to do in our 
overall theory than the traditional, minimalist notion, whose main role is to preserve 
an old dogma. Devitt might respond that that intuitive notion already exists in the tra-
ditional framework: it corresponds to ‘speaker’s meaning’ or ‘what is communicated’ 
(as opposed to what is literally said). But I deny this: what is said in the intuitive sense 
is not the same thing as what is communicated (which is a more encompassing notion 
covering, inter alia, things that are ‘implied’ without being part of intuitive truth-
conditional content). 
4 If this is right, then, of course, there will be an indefinite number of possible 
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